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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Today’s changes in Ethiopia are rapid, confusing and disruptive. They 
promise openness and democratization, but also contain perils. Like many 
others, I am struggling to place them in a context that allows me to make 
sense of what is happening now and what may happen in the near future.
I find much of the commentary on Ethiopia’s current predicament to 
be polarized, generalized or not sufficiently attuned to the specifics 
of the country’s recent history. In my case, one prism through which I 
interpret Ethiopian developments is the analysis derived from numerous 
discussions that I had with Meles Zenawi between 1988 and 2012. I 
initially developed the framework of the ‘political marketplace’ as a 
critique of Meles’s theory of the ‘democratic developmental state’. In 
particular, I saw monetized or marketized politics as a threat to the state-
led developmental order that Meles envisioned: I argued that as well as 
the two scenarios he envisaged, namely economic transformation versus a 
relapse into poverty and chaos, there was a third: a political marketplace.
The rationale for this paper is that these two frameworks, the 
developmental state and the political marketplace, offer analytical insights 
that are important for understanding Ethiopia today. 
This paper has two parts. The first is based on those conversations with 
Meles. I have notes from many of them (especially from the period 2007-
2012) and recollections of others. I have organized them into the themes 
of the developmental state, democracy and nationalism, and foreign 
policy and security strategy. In each case what I present are amalgams of 
notes, verbatim transcripts, and a few inferences. They are rearranged for 
coherence.
The second part asks questions relevant to Ethiopians today. I use the 
conceptual vocabulary of the developmental state and the political 
marketplace, to point to some lessons that might be learned and applied.
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(I) CONVERSATIONS 
WITH MELES ZENAWI
The Developmental State
AdW: What is the developmental state? 
MZ: The definition of the developmental 
state has three components. First it must be 
autonomous from the private sector. It should 
make use of the private sector and guide it, 
but also be independent from it. The class 
base of such a state should be an atomized 
and satisfied peasantry: atomized in the sense 
that the peasantry are becoming capitalist 
and have abandoned their allegiances to 
intermediate social entities, and satisfied in 
that their material well-being is improving. 
The developmental state should control the 
commanding heights of the economy so as to be 
able to lead the private sector (banks, utilities, 
some key production sectors).
The second characteristic is obsession with 
development. It must pursue accelerated 
economic growth as its absolute and overriding 
priority. Development should be a matter of 
national survival; the ideology should be that 
growth is survival. 
The third component is the hegemony of 
developmental discourse (hegemony in the 
Gramscian sense of being an unreflective, 
internalized set of assumptions, not an imposed 
order). The norms and values of our society 
must be based on value-creation and growth. 
Our small-scale producers must be focused on 
improving their material well-being through 
production.
AdW: Why is this better than the 
Washington Consensus programme 
of economic liberalization?
MZ: One problem we face is that, in common 
with every other African country, our economy 
is very small, and the economic power 
possessed by the government relative to the 
size of the economy is very great. This creates 
outside rent-seeking opportunities to those in 
political office. It’s not a question of whether 
the state will allocate rents, but how it will do 
it. Will it be an activist, developmental rent-
allocator, or will it be a passive rent-allocator? 
If the state isn’t activist, the most capable 
people in the country will congregate around 
government office and direct those rents into 
their own pockets, and we will see the state as 
a network of patronage that facilitates massive 
corruption and capital flight.
The fundamental problem we face is that 
Ethiopia’s factors of production are so 
constrained, that we can never complete in 
a globalized market without an activist state 
guiding our development. This activist state isn’t 
just investing at a micro-scale but is guiding 
the entire economy, allocating state rents in a 
strategic manner.
AdW: Is Ethiopia’s developmental 
state modeled on China?
MZ: No. We take elements of different models 
from around the world. One of the benefits of 
the multipolar world is that we no longer need 
to stick with a single paradigm for development. 
When we came to power in 1991, it was an 
inauspicious time for any kind of political 
economic model that wasn’t based on unfettered 
liberal capitalism and the nightwatchman state, 
so we had to hide our agenda of state control 
and bide our time. With the rise of China, the 
Washington Consensus lost its global hegemony. 
That didn’t simply give us a choice between two 
models, but something far more important: it 
meant that we were able to pick and choose 
among the aspects of different models that 
existed around the world. In the 2001 document 
on foreign policy and national security, we 
determined that we would select what is most 
suitable for Ethiopia from different countries 
around the world: the U.S., Germany, China, 
Korea, wherever. I call it the ‘Frank Sinatra’ 
model: ‘I did it my way.’
AdW: How do you analyze corruption?
MZ: Corruption is everywhere, in fact the only 
non-corrupt states in the world are the northern 
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European protestants.
Let me make a distinction between pervasive 
rent-seeking and corruption. The developmental 
state can be corrupt (as in South Korea and 
Taiwan). In these countries, officials take bribes. 
For example, customs officials routinely ask for 
additional payments for importing goods, worth 
12 percent of the value of consumer goods but 
exclude the key capital goods that drive the 
country’s development. Even the thieves have 
internalized the developmental ethos: that is true 
hegemony! In other countries, by contrast (for 
example India), corruption is across the board the 
thieves take their cut by lowering the quality of 
construction and manufacturing. 
Rent-seeking is getting an income or a reward for 
doing nothing except occupying a position. It can 
be entirely legal. In fact if the rent-seekers are in 
government they can write the laws to suit them.
Corruption and rent-seeking are connected. 
Rent-seeking is the perfect environment for 
corruption to thrive. You can have the most 
perfect macroeconomic policies but if the politics 
are wrong, you have the wrong class alliance with 
rent-seekers in power, it is a recipe for corruption. 
And once the institutions of government have 
become controlled by rent-seekers it is almost 
impossible to uproot corruption. Look at the way 
in which anti-corruption drives simply become 
a mechanism for a leader to purge his rivals and 
opponents.
AdW: What are the obstacles to 
the developmental state?
MZ: Development is not a process of 
capital accumulation but should be defined 
as technological capacity development. 
Hence it is essential to focus on education, 
especially secondary and tertiary, research 
and development. The day-to-day practice 
of producing goods contributes to this, in a 
dialectical approach to capacity building. This is 
part of the process of making value-creation into 
the driving hegemonic value in our society. But 
technological capacity development takes time. 
And in the meantime we face enormous obstacles, 
some of them external (such as the inevitable 
fluctuations in the conditions of the global market, 
which can wipe out any of our infant industries 
virtually overnight) and some of them internal 
(most threateningly, the constant temptation of 
rent-seeking). We need to power ahead to achieve 
middle-income status, so that we have met the 
threshold conditions for sustainable growth.
AdW: My concern here is that you have 
both underestimated and mischaracterized 
the challenges to sustainable growth. 
You identify corruption as an economic 
problem. But it is also a political problem. 
The most dangerous form of political 
corruption occurs when political loyalties 
and services can be bought and sold on the 
market, not just in individual transactions 
or one-off deals, but in a systematic manner 
as in market. We see different kinds of 
political marketplace in neighbouring 
countries. In Somalia, it is obvious.
MZ: You are correct: our attempts to identify the 
basis for a developmental state in Somalia have so 
far completely failed, and all we can do is operate 
on a tactical basis. We rent loyalties of Somali 
factions on contracts that typically last 18 months, 
no longer.
AdW: In Sudan, it is also obvious though it is 
more complicated, because there is a market 
among the political-commercial elites within 
Khartoum, and the institutions of government 
resemble Weberian institutions on the 
outside, but are run on the basis of supply 
and demand on the inside. And in Kenya, 
political competition has been so thoroughly 
marketized that elections have become an 
exercise in competitive political financing, and 
the cost of loyalty has become so high that the 
political parties are literally consuming the 
state to pay for their political ambitions.
MZ: But in Kenya the political financiers are the 
domestic capitalist class and they will always 
stop short of going over the precipice. When their 
politicians take them to that point, and when the 
level of plunder of public resources gets to the 
point of implosion, and when the politicians turn 
to incentivizing their supporters by rioting and 
looting, the national bourgeoisie will step in and 
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say, enough is enough.
AdW: And that is exactly what we have seen, 
first in stepping back from the brink in 
2008, and subsequently in the new devolved 
constitution, which is quite explicitly a 
mechanism for giving those elites who lose 
at national level, a second chance to eat at 
provincial level.
MZ: The most sophisticated political marketplaces 
are India and the United States. In India you can 
calculate exactly what it costs to buy an election, 
but the big national issues have been settled 
by the economic elites in advance, so the issues 
settled by the election are only the secondary 
ones. And in the U.S., do you every wonder why 
big corporate donors give money to both parties? 
Of course they want some influence on whatever 
candidate wins, but the fundamental reason is 
that they want to keep the price of power high so 
that ordinary citizens can’t influence the process. 
If they donate to everyone, the American oligarchs 
can keep the barriers to entering the market as 
very high.
AdW: But the reason I raise this is, of course, 
because of its relevance to Ethiopia. I think 
your framework for the developmental state 
underestimates the possibility that there 
can be reversals—some of them catastrophic 
reversals—in the process of developing 
institutions and creating a viable capitalist 
economy. The driving force behind those 
reversals can be the logic of the political 
marketplace: political power becoming 
tradable, and elections becoming expensive. 
Ethiopia doesn’t possess the kind of national 
capitalist class that can give a pull on the reins 
to keep this under control. I wonder what an 
Ethiopian political marketplace would look 
like?
MZ: We have been thinking about how the EPRDF 
as a party should engage with the private sector. 
It’s best to keep the private sector at a distance 
and keep the party financed by membership dues. 
We should avoid business finance which would 
determine the short term activities of the party. 
But we need alternative means of engagement 
with them. Their representatives can attend our 
congress through a mechanism of private sector 
associations. We are moving in this direction; 
most of private sector is becoming supportive of 
the EPRDF.
AdW: I’m sure this is a good approach, but 
it’s at the level of tactical policy engagement 
and regulation, not systemic. The danger 
is that the regulator will be vulnerable to 
capture by well-financed businesses or foreign 
governments. 
MZ: You mean that the Ethiopian state could 
be bought? I don’t see that happening short of 
a counter-revolution, in which case, the rent-
seekers will sell anything and everything. If that 
happens, well, Ethiopia won’t be a failed state so it 
won’t be a laissez-faire open political market like 
Somalia. We are not a rentier state so we won’t 
become an oil-based kleptocracy like Sudan. Or 
for that matter a one-man mafia-style business as 
in Eritrea! The Kenyan example is more intriguing, 
but we don’t have that national business class. 
But you are correct: your analysis is a powerful 
tool for the archetypical African state, and it 
demystifies the actual conduct of politics on the 
continent. You need to elaborate further. At the 
moment you are dealing with the political elite, 
you should bring in the masses in the rural and 
urban areas, how are they affected? You need to 
explain which social forces generate deeper rent 
seeking: are they inside the state structure or 
outside it? 
AdW: We don’t have a good framework for 
this. The vocabulary of authoritarianism and 
democracy doesn’t capture it. The notion 
of state capture—when a configuration of 
private interests takes over the apparatus of 
institutional government—is closer. 
Ethiopia also belongs to that special category 
of liberation movements in power, and we can 
see different trajectories for how they have 
adapted. Some become big man patrimonial 
systems (such as Uganda or Zimbabwe). Some 
become monopolistic business states (such as 
Rwanda). Some achieve limited liberalization 
(such as Mozambique). But one category to 
which we need to pay particular attention is 
the emergence of a rivalrous oligarchy. What 
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happened in Algeria was that different power 
bases within the ruling coalition established a 
modus vivendi in which they collude, but also 
compete in a limited manner.
I like to frame it as political firms that operate 
in various configurations of a market: a public 
service utility which is a genuine monopoly, 
a free market in which anyone can trade, or 
a limited competition oligopoly. Ethiopia is 
basically a public service utility, in which the 
consumer-citizens can only take the service on 
offer at a fixed price. 
MZ: Is this a metaphor or are you saying that 
politics actually functions like this? You should 
refine this framework.
Democracy and Nationalism
AdW: You insist that Ethiopia must be a 
democratic developmental state. But many 
people would argue that while you have 
delivered on the development, there hasn’t 
been any progress on democracy.
MZ: Let’s be clear what we mean when we talk 
about democracy: it must be a democracy of 
real choices. If we allow unfettered political 
competition today, the rent-seekers will be able to 
offer far more to the voters than a developmental 
party can. Part of it is false promises of all the 
goodies that will come taking power. Part of it 
is the windfall profits of privatizing key sectors 
such as banking and telecoms and selling off 
profitable corporations such as Ethiopian Airlines. 
And part of it is the zero-sum political calculus 
of winner takes all, loser takes nothing. That 
kind of democracy isn’t offering real choices. 
What would be a real choice is between different 
paths to value-creating development. We could have a dominant party system, as we have today, 
with different views expressed within the party. 
Or we could have competition between two 
parties, each of them subscribing to a hegemonic 
developmentalism, so that when they rotate in 
and out of office, the fundamentals of the national 
project aren’t in dispute.
AdW: But I worry that this is tantamount 
to saying to the Ethiopian people, you can 
have democracy, but only in a watered down 
version, and you will have to wait until we’re a 
middle-income country.
MZ: That is precisely why we cannot afford to 
wait. We have to push ahead with this accelerated 
development. We must have growth, growth, 
growth. The pressures for a conventional liberal 
democracy are there and cannot be contained 
indefinitely. What’s essential for our national 
survival is that we have achieved sufficient 
economic growth that when the transition comes, 
it is manageable and doesn’t jeopardize our 
developmental state.
We can’t have patriotism with an empty belly and 
we can’t have democracy with an empty belly 
either. Take your issue of food security which 
we have discussed so much. Imagine if there is a 
serious drought or another so-called world food 
crisis and we let the market take care of it: the 
price of staple food in Ethiopia will double. That’s 
a national security emergency: look at how food 
price rises led to the Arab Spring. Even in our 
much more backward economy in the 1970s the 
starvation in Wollo was one of the immediate 
causal factors in overthrow of the Imperial 
regime. We estimate that if the prices of teff and 
other cereals go up by 50 percent in the main 
urban markets we will have serious disturbances 
on our hands, and so we cannot let that happen. 
Our national food security must be centrally 
managed. If we liberalize this sector we are taking 
a risk that we cannot afford to run. 
Don’t underestimate this danger. We have been 
lucky, but we are not in the clear on this yet.
AdW: You are persuasive about the dangers of 
reckless liberalization. But is there a roadmap 
for achieving it in a more managed manner?
MZ: The trajectory for the evolution of democracy 
must focus on the norms and values that make 
democracy real. We don’t have the social and 
economic base for following the western model 
of democratizing through a piecemeal expansion 
of rights, though those will come in due course. 
It is not enough to have a political economy of 
value-creation: the democratic ethos also has to 
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be hegemonic. Germany from 1870-1945 was 
a classic case of value creation in the economic 
sphere but without the democratic ethos. We 
need a ‘whole cloth democracy’ which will have 
many impurities that need to be eliminated as 
we go along. We have inherited many problems 
from our feudal past including value systems. 
The opposition is not comfortable with the 
constitution as such: they wanted to change the 
constitution by unconstitutional means. They play 
the democratic game in order to throw out the 
rules of the game. 
AdW: You have massively expanded the 
membership of the EPRDF, and fused 
it in with the governmental apparatus. 
Isn’t that dangerous for the prospects of 
democratization? Doesn’t that invite exactly 
the danger that you are concerned to 
avoid—that a change in government or even 
a challenge to the EPRDF rule will actually 
dismantle the apparatus of government itself?
MZ: In the wake of the setbacks of 2005, 
we had no choice but to emphasize the 
developmental project, and seek hegemony 
for developmentalism. We need our people to 
internalize value creation; to drink it, to breathe it. 
But you are right that we must move on from 
that stage. Our party used to be a vanguard party 
in which the production of ideas, debate on 
policy, and implementation were all extremely 
high quality and were seamless. We never had a 
problem with implementation because the same 
individuals who were engaged in producing the 
policies were those that implemented them. 
We were close to the ideal type of democratic 
centralism. We cannot do that any more: our state 
is much more complicated and our party has 
changed its character, to become a transmission 
belt instead of a vanguard.
One of the things that is striking about developed 
countries is the proliferation of think tanks, set 
up by political parties, government departments, 
corporations and philanthropists. As Ethiopia 
develops we are going to need those kinds of 
institutions. That’s why I was enthusiastic about 
your proposal regarding the Tana Forum and 
why we need to do similar things for social and 
economic policy. We need the element of plurality 
in thinking about African development.
AdW: The most controversial element in the 
Ethiopian constitution is the organization 
of administration and politics by national 
group, and the right of self-determination. I 
have always been intrigued by the fact that 
you adopted the Soviet definition of nations 
and a Soviet-style multi-national constitution, 
because that element of Marxist-Leninism 
is theoretically the weakest, and was deeply 
problematic in government—in fact it led to 
the breakup of Yugoslavia and the USSR at just 
about the same time as you were introducing 
it here in Ethiopia.
MZ: The issue of nationalities is one that we 
cannot ignore. It was the question that broke the 
Dergue and it would have broken us too, had we 
not adopted the approach that we did. This is the 
other element to democracy in Ethiopia that you 
cannot overlook. In Taiwan and South Korea there 
was no issue of nationalities: they are entirely 
mono-ethnic societies and they could pursue their 
developmental state on an authoritarian basis 
accordingly. We cannot do that because the people 
would not stand for it.
AdW: Let me explain my thinking more. 
Modern nationalism is a product of 
industrialization: nation-states emerged 
from the industrial revolution and the 
administrative apparatus necessary for the 
organization of mass production, as well 
as military competition among industrial 
states both in Europe and for colonies. In 
pre-industrial agrarian economies there is no 
such thing as nationalism in this sense: it is a 
product of historical change. 
Two things follow from this. The first is that 
any attempt to define nations and nationalities 
in a non-industrial society involves applying 
a set of more-or-less arbitrary criteria 
concerning language, culture, territory, etc. If 
the criteria are adjusted even ever-so-slightly, 
the groups or populations that are identified 
as nations will alter, their boundaries will 
change, etc. The second is that economic 
development—of exactly the kind that 
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Ethiopia is undergoing now—will change the 
character of those national entities. People 
will migrate, they will be organized differently, 
cultures will change. This is normal. So how 
will your definition of ‘nation’ change as 
Ethiopia industrializes? And what does this 
mean for the constitution?
MZ: This is a critically important point that we 
have not resolved. It may be the most politically 
sensitive and explosive question that we need 
to face. Our federal formula was devised during 
the transition in negotiation with the OLF. 
Having been the most articulate element in 
defining the Oromo people, and demanding 
self-determination for them, the OLF were 
unable to form a coherent political programme 
that could represent those Oromo people. They 
regressed to a narrow nationalism that is the 
obverse of developmentalism or democratic 
nationalism. Meanwhile the chauvinists adopted 
another pathology of nationalism, inherited 
from the feudal-imperial past, of a pan-Ethiopian 
chauvinism that refuses to recognize other 
national-cultural entities as equals. For us to 
move forward it is absolutely essential that the 
equal status of nations and nationalities is not 
only enshrined in the Federal Constitution but 
is internalized as part of our common political 
discourse. This is the foundation of democratic 
nationalism.
AdW: But I still see some big problems. Nations 
are not static and unchanging, especially 
when they are entities within a ‘nation of 
nations’. Isn’t there a danger of getting stuck 
with a system that cannot adapt to historical 
changes—especially with the pace of economic 
development that is now occurring?
MZ: That is why we are decentralizing important 
elements of governance, such as budgeting, to 
the zonal level and even lower. We need to have 
the right balance between the powers that are 
held at all different levels of government. If we 
invest too much in one single layer, there is the 
danger that the corresponding level of officialdom 
will become rent-seekers based on the outsized 
administrative privileges of that particular 
level. When the system was designed in 1991, 
the nations determined the administration. We 
want to avoid a situation in future where the 
administration determines the nations, which is 
what doomed Yugoslavia and the USSR.
There is also no reason why the EPRDF should be 
comprised of constituent parties that match the 
federal entities and are confined to them. There 
is no other federal system where party politics 
is run on this basis. We are considering making 
the EPRDF into a single unified national party. 
This would be a logical step, but it needs to be 
taken at the correct time with all the necessary 
preparation.
Foreign Policy and 
National Security
AdW: What is the strategic objective of 
Ethiopia’s foreign policy?
MZ: Ethiopia is proud and we feel our national 
humiliations deeply. The source of our 
country’s humiliation in our time is poverty and 
backwardness. National pride is not a policy 
objective in itself: we must realize it through 
realizing democracy and development.
Our national survival is not guaranteed unless 
we overcome poverty. Our national security 
and foreign policy are therefore based on our 
economy, specifically our fundamental goal of 
economic development. Every aspect of our 
foreign relations must be geared to this goal. 
This is the new element in our strategy and it is 
a departure from the old way of thinking about 
Ethiopia’s national security, which was to identify 
threats one by one and figure out how to defend 
ourselves. Our national security is now based 
on our own national goals, and that is achieving 
economic development.
Ethiopia can never rely on any external power. 
We have no guaranteed friends. This is an old 
principle and it won’t change. Even when we 
have conquered poverty and achieved middle 
income status we will remain a weak country 
that could be prey to outside interference and 
destabilization. For that reason must avoid over-
dependence on any one power and instead must 
diversify our aid, trade and security relationships.
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Ethiopia’s foreign policy has in fact been quite 
consistent on the principle of diversifying 
international links, with the exception of the 
period of the Dergue. That is also why we invest 
in the African Union and the United Nations and 
other multilateral organizations.
AdW: Why is the conflict with Eritrea so 
intractable?
MZ: At some point we will find a way to live 
together with Eritrea: that is inevitable. The 
issues that divide us are entirely down to some 
idiotic posturing and not only on the Eritrean 
side. Isseyas needs a face-saving formula, and it 
shouldn’t be difficult to find one. He cannot forgive 
the Weyane for defeating his unconquerable army 
and so he is looking to punish them. One way he 
would like to this is to dismantle Ethiopia which 
is proving a lot more difficult than he thought. 
The other strategy is to hang on until he can find 
enough Ethiopians who can also demonize the 
Weyane. And for the time being the permanent 
state of tension is helpful to Isseyas, a reason for 
his survival. He knows that he won’t survive any 
democratization.
What we need are less emotional relations 
with Eritrea. A more sober policy.  The border 
question is irrelevant. The key is normalization of 
economic and social relations. We need Eritrean 
ports: we will reach the capacity of Djibouti soon 
and we need to diversify our access to the sea. If 
normalization isn’t possible, we should avoid war, 
by deterring the other side. We think we have 
convinced them that war isn’t a feasible option.
In the long term, Eritrea has a high potential to be 
a developmental state, but it might be too late for 
EPLF to be part of it. It also makes no sense for 
Eritrea to be isolated from our strategy of regional 
infrastructural integration: Eritrea should be 
connected to our power grids and our transport 
network.
AdW: The 2002 White Paper on national 
security and foreign policy speaks of the 
importance of having a public discussion of 
defence strategy with the aim of forging a 
national consensus. Did this ever happen?
MZ: No. In  the event we have had other priorities.
AdW: What is your greatest fear?
MZ: We need to look beyond our immediate issues 
such as Eritrea, Somalia and the problems of the 
two Sudans. Those issues we can handle though 
sometimes they are costly. We face two strategic 
adversaries. 
One is Egypt. This is curious because Egypt has 
much in common with us and has the potential 
to be a truly developmental state and a partner 
in revolutionary democracy. But Egypt has found 
itself trapped in the scale of its historic ambition 
for regional dominance and its historic failure to 
achieve that ambition. Until it escapes that sense 
of disappointment it will never be able to develop, 
and it will instead be a negative force dragging 
down the region. Ethiopia plays a special role in 
Egypt’s sense of its historic hinterland because 
of the Nile. For Egypt, the Nile Water is seen 
an existential issue, and Egyptian leaders will 
use every means at their disposal to prevent us 
from exploiting the Nile waters. What they fail to 
realize is that the Nile Waters are an existential 
issue for us too. At some point in the future, we 
will identify our common interests, on economic 
development, regional infrastructure and security, 
and achieve the technical formula for dividing 
the Nile Waters that satisfies all the states of the 
Nile Basin. But while Egypt remains in the grip 
of a counter-revolution, and unable to satisfy the 
demands of its people for a better life, it will not 
be able to achieve this strategic reorientation.
The second is Saudi Arabia and more generally 
the Gulf states. They possess a level of resources 
that we will never, ever match. And the manner in 
which they can use those resources is not subject 
to any constraint. In your terminology, they have 
vast political budgets and when they decide to 
spend them, they first of all purchase loyalties. 
That’s a tactical issue as they usually have a 
short attention span so the political product they 
purchase is highly discounted. But second and 
more importantly these political payments make 
the rent-seekers dream big. What follows is the 
most hegemonic manifestation of corruption: the 
corruption of the beggar who sits waiting for his 
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benefactor, every single day, whether or not that 
benefactor actually shows up on any particular 
day.
My nightmare is that the two should combine: 
that we should have an Egyptian agenda that is 
financed by Gulf money. I used to fear that this 
would happen with Islamist revolutions in both 
countries. Today I fear that it will happen because 
the security and commercial interests of the Arab 
countries will converge on an agenda of imposing 
tight control over their southern perimeters. With 
instability throughout the Middle East, Egypt and 
the Gulf monarchies cannot afford to have trouble 
on their southern periphery, and when they can 
no longer rely on the Americans to keep order, 
they will club together to do it themselves. The 
entire Horn of Africa will become their buffer 
zone. Imagine how much weaker Ethiopia’s 
position will be with the UAE controlling every port we use and singing to the tune of Egyptian 
foreign affairs.
We cannot stop this from happening as the factors 
that would drive it are outside our control. But we 
can ensure that we have the leverage to minimize 
the damage and retain our autonomy.
AdW: How does Ethiopia retain its autonomy 
in the era of globalization?
MZ: Globalization is a reality that we have to live 
with. Managing this reality and turning it to our 
advantage where we can, is the final pillar of our 
foreign policy and security strategy. Even when 
we achieve middle income status we will still be 
a weak player globally. We absolutely need our 
policy autonomy, or our gains will always be in 
danger of reversal. We could privatize our key 
economic assets and liberalize our land and food 
policies at any time. We would get some windfall 
financial gains from that, and those who bought 
up our assets would get even bigger windfall 
profits, but if we do that any time soon we will 
be the loser. Whoever buys up those assets, and 
without doubt they will be underpriced, will also 
buy a stake in our politics. And if we lose control 
of our land and food policies we will be exposed 
to global market forces that we cannot control but 
which can determine our destiny, at any time and 
without any warning.
Economic integration with the African continent 
is critical. All African economies, even South 
Africa, are too small to be truly developmental. 
They will always be susceptible to rent-seeking at 
the state level. In Ethiopia we are not in a position 
to open our market to the rest of the continent, as 
our manufacturing is not yet competitive without 
protective measures. So our integration is driven 
by infrastructure. This is where we learn from the 
Chinese, both in the technical and the political-
economic aspects. Then in time we can gradually 
open our markets.
Multilateralism cannot cure our predicament 
but it is absolutely essential to alleviating it. Our 
foreign relations protect our autonomy to the 
degree that we conduct them in a multilateral 
fashion. The United Nations and the African Union 
are prone to making stupid decisions but it is 
much better that we are part of them, mitigating 
their stupidity and improving them where we can, 
than we turn our backs on them and complain 
about our vulnerabilities.
 Because we are the host country for the African 
Union, we try to be as discreet as we can in 
influencing the organization. We don’t want 
other African states to be resentful and suspect 
that we are abusing our privileges as host. This 
means that the AU doesn’t have the profile that it 
warrants in Ethiopia or indeed within the EPRDF 
itself.
Globalization is first and foremost a political 
process. Don’t underestimate the power of setting 
the agenda. One area in which we can lead is 
shaping the global agenda. We are doing this 
on climate change. We are planning to do it on 
biotech. We are doing it in a discreet way on peace 
and security, but it is important that we lead from 
behind because this is an area in which we can 
easily invoke jealousies. We also would like to lead 
on this topic of the democratic developmental 
state: it’s not an issue that I can speak about 
publicly, too loudly, when I am in office, but the 
moment will come.
Agenda setting is the most elusive form of power, 
what Joe Nye calls ‘soft power’. It’s hard to achieve 
and so easy to lose. When Ethiopia becomes an 
agenda taker not an agenda setter then that will 
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be a signal that we will be in danger.
(II) QUESTIONS FOR 
ETHIOPIANS TODAY
This second part of the paper poses a number 
of key questions that arise from the previous 
conversations and the current predicament. I use 
the conceptual vocabulary of the developmental 
state and the political marketplace, as well as 
nationalism and identity politics, to pose some 
questions.
What agenda is PM Abiy setting?
In the few short months since Abiy Ahmed was 
elevated to Prime Minister he has set about 
changing Ethiopia’s political landscape at an 
extremely fast pace. He has dominated the 
political agenda in an unprecedented manner: not 
even Meles at the height of his powers was able 
to tackle so many issues at the same time. Abiy is 
certainly setting a political agenda in the sense of 
making the running and compelling everyone else 
in Ethiopia to respond to his initiatives.
Two questions follow. 
First, is this his agenda or is this an agenda 
imposed from elsewhere? Some of the priorities 
of the Abiy administration seem to reflect those 
of the U.S. (and some influential think tanks 
in Washington DC) and key U.S. allies in the 
region (notably the United Arab Emirates). That 
alignment should not be taken at face value. The 
U.S. coalition with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE is currently the dominant force in the 
wider region and it would be foolish not to play 
along with it, at least tactically.
Second, does Abiy have his own strategic vision for 
Ethiopia? Has he taken on the basic precepts of 
the existing EPRDF economic, political or security 
strategy, and merely adjusted them to current 
realities? Or has he developed new thinking which 
will emerge in due course?
Insofar as the PM has advisors who are drawing 
on the dominant strands of international 
scholarship on liberalization and democratization, 
I caution strongly against applying general 
models to the Ethiopian case. There are too 
many historical particularities in Ethiopia—the 
extraordinarily rapid economic development, 
the complexities of the federal system and 
identity politics, the regional security context—
that militate against using general blueprints. 
Ethiopian intellectuals often undervalue their 
indigenous tradition of political thought. The right 
balance is needed between general lessons and 
Ethiopian specificities.
Is Ethiopia still a developmental state?
Ethiopia is growing fast—it is developing. But 
is it a developmental state? This has three 
components: (1) the strategy of state-directed 
economic growth; (2) the commitment to pro-
poor welfare policies; and (3) the nature of the 
state institutions themselves.
I will not ask whether Ethiopia is following 
Meles’s blueprint, because that would be a 
misreading of his intellectual style. He did not 
write a sacred doctrine and demand that his 
followers parrot it: what he did was to apply an 
analytical method to the Ethiopian predicament 
to arrive at a diagnostic, relevant to the immediate 
circumstance, and derive a set of policies from 
that. So the questions to ask are: (a) is Ethiopia 
a developmental state in its general sense, 
namely a state, autonomous from domestic and 
international private sector interests, that is 
committed to sustainable economic growth and 
transformation? And, (b) what stage in such 
a historic process has Ethiopia reached, and 
what does this imply? The two questions are 
interlocking.
So, question (1): is the state-directed strategy of 
economic growth intact?
The core metric of Ethiopia’s developmentalism 
is economic growth. For all its shortcomings, it is 
the measure used around the world and the one 
that was used and celebrated by Meles and his 
immediate successors. Thus far, Ethiopia’s GDP 
growth has not stalled. Economic development 
continues apace. In 2012, the year of Meles’s 
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death, Ethiopia’s GDP was $43 billion; in 2018 it 
will be close to $90 billion. At this rate of growth, 
Ethiopia will become a middle-income country by 
2022.
The fact that Ethiopia has recorded its fastest-
ever period of growth in the last six years can be 
interpreted many ways: as testament to Meles’s 
vision and legacy; as testament to his successors’ 
competence in economic management; as the 
outcome of favourable circumstances.
Under any theory of the developmental state, 
profound changes will occur as a country 
becomes middle-income. These changes affect the 
structure of the economy, many aspects of social 
relations, and the nature of politics. 
The character of Ethiopian economy is changing 
fast: state control becomes less necessary 
and less effective as the economy grows and 
diversifies. Reforms such as lightening the 
regulatory hand, privatizing state-owned 
corporations, and opening up the economy to 
closer integration into the African and global 
market, are all compatible with a developmental 
state. 
The first subordinate question is whether the 
country has reached the stage of development 
where any such liberalization is possible 
without losing the developmental vision and 
ethos. There is no clear answer, but some of the 
benefits, costs and risks can be identified. The 
partial privatization of the banking and telecom 
sectors, and Ethiopian Airlines, will bring help 
fill immediate gaps in the national finances, 
especially foreign currency. There will be a trade-
off in terms of future state revenues and control. 
And, given that the domestic business class is 
weak, it is likely that the main stakeholders 
will be foreign corporations or states (perhaps 
sovereign funds): whoever buys a controlling 
stake will have enormous political leverage in the 
country.
The decision, taken in March, for Ethiopia to join 
the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
is also a step away from the previous strategy of 
protecting key industrial sectors and pursuing 
an infrastructure-led integration strategy. Among 
other things, this will have repercussions for 
how business is conducted with Eritrea, as the 
Eritrean economy is even less well-placed to take 
advantage of market integration, should it take 
steps in that direction. However, there are still key 
policy decisions to be taken about the pace and 
details of implementation of AfCFTA integration.
This leads to the second subordinate question, 
is how the reforms are handled. If they lead 
to a broad-based shareholder economy and 
the growth of a national class with a stake 
in Ethiopian corporate capitalism, they will 
definitely be a step in the right direction. On the other hand, if the reforms are managed with an 
eye to short-term gains, the likely outcome will 
be takeovers by those with an eye on windfall 
profits and future rent-seeking through access 
to influence over the state. That would be a 
regressive step. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian 
diaspora—which has capital, expertise and global 
business networks—could be a swing player, 
either helping to consolidate a national capitalist 
class, or else facilitating the international takeover 
of the commanding heights of the economy.
The developmental nature of the Ethiopian state 
is therefore in the balance.
Does Ethiopia have a pro-poor agenda?
Question (2) of the developmental state is the 
social agenda. The developmental state is also a 
state with an ambitious welfare programme, with 
an eye to protecting the poor and vulnerable, 
developing human capital, and easing the 
transition to a capitalist society. 
Economic growth at the pace experienced by 
Ethiopia brings accelerated social changes. 
It brings migration, urbanization, disruption 
to livelihoods and social mores, and societal 
upheaval. New classes emerge associated with the 
booming sectors. Tax collectors, local government 
officials, police officers and statisticians struggle 
to keep pace with the changes. There are losers 
The character of Ethiopian economy is 
changing fast: state control becomes 
less necessary and less effective as the 
economy grows and diversifies.
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too: those whose livelihoods and social status are 
damaged, and those whose worldviews and value 
systems are upended. Some are objective losers, 
left destitute as their skills or assets are no longer 
needed or because they have been defrauded of 
their land or inheritance because of their illiteracy 
or powerlessness. Some are subjective losers, 
finding themselves lower down on the ladder of 
social esteem.
Ethiopia is just at the beginning of managing 
the traumas associated with this accelerated 
transformation. The new administration should 
have no illusions that there are any quick fixes to 
the socio-economic disruptions associated with 
this transition to capitalism. Despite Ethiopia’s 
rapid growth there are still tens of millions of 
desperately poor and vulnerable people: and 
there will be for the foreseeable future.
There are the traditional poor: the peasants. 
One of the most important, but least celebrated 
achievements of Ethiopia was averting a 
national food crisis in 2015/16, following the 
most widespread drought and crop failures in 
history. The government responded quickly and 
expeditiously to the problem, putting its own 
resources up front for a massive humanitarian 
and food security programme. Meles’s fear that 
a 50 percent rise in food prices would bring 
political crisis was not tested: food prices rose 
by 30 percent at most, and although there were 
very widespread protests in small towns and rural 
areas, food prices did not become a political issue, 
and the areas affected by the riots were not the 
same as those afflicted by the food crisis. That was 
an object lesson in the insight that food security is 
national security: the EPRDF survived the political 
crisis, which it might not have done without its 
massive food security programme.
Food crisis was the dog that didn’t bark in the 
night. Will PM Abiy’s administration keep the 
national food security plans and mechanisms 
intact? He would be well advised to do so.
The fact that Ethiopia weathered this major 
adversity without losing growth shows that 
external factors have not been entirely favourable: 
Ethiopia’s economic performance cannot be 
attributed to good luck. 
There are the new poor: the newly urbanized 
and landless, the high-school graduates without 
jobs, the people whose low-skilled employment 
is insecure because of the volatility in the global 
market for their goods. Ethiopia has pioneered 
various forms of social welfare safety nets. They 
are less comprehensive, advanced and effective 
for these new categories of poor people, but the 
government has been making impressive efforts. This is a strength that the new administration 
should seek to build upon.
Ethiopia possesses a welfarist component to its 
the developmental state model, embedded in its 
institutions for food security, public services and 
national planning. If these institutions remain 
functional, a central pillar of the developmental 
state will remain intact. Moreover, maintaining 
these essential functions will be pivotal to social 
and political stability.
What kind of state institutions 
is Ethiopia developing?
The third component of the developmental 
state question focuses on the state: what kind of 
state institutions are being developed? Can they 
endure?
One reason why PM Abiy’s reforms command 
such popular enthusiasm is that a wide variety 
of different political philosophies support an agenda of transforming institutions that are seen 
as corrupt, repressive or undemocratic. However, 
dismantling institutions is much easier than 
rebuilding them, and de-institutionalization can 
have seriously adverse consequences.
Many liberals, neo-conservatives and alt-right 
advocates of disruption share a philosophical 
premise that government’s bureaucratic 
institutions do more harm than good, and lifting 
their dead hand from economics and politics 
will unleash the creativities of the people and 
the productive power of market capitalism. 
Experience has shown that this does not hold 
in countries that have not yet attained a certain 
level of economic development, and/or those 
in which the political ‘rules of the game’ are not 
settled. Instead of democratizing, these countries 
tend to transform either into political markets 
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or authoritarian systems, or descend into civil 
wars. (The central Asian republics of the former 
USSR after 1993, Iraq after 2003 and most Arab 
Spring countries after 2011 are examples.) In 
such countries, if political transformation is to 
be achieved without societal breakdown, then 
institutional continuity is advisable. Ethiopia possesses an important asset in that 
its people have historically had a high regard for 
authority. The relative smoothness of the 1991 
transition was partly attributable to this factor. 
However, with the rapid socio-economic changes 
of recent years, the orderliness of Ethiopian 
society is not guaranteed. 
The likely impacts of rapid changes to institutions 
can be understood in a more nuanced way by 
reference to institutional theories of the state.
Dominant political science theories of the state 
emphasize its institutional nature, either in the 
sense (following Max Weber) of being a set of 
impartial, rule-bound governing bureaucracies 
for the administration of public affairs, or the 
new institutional economics’ sense (following 
Douglass North) of it being a set of ‘rules of 
the game’ for political life. Weberian and new 
institutional economics share the premise that 
a state is developed when its institutions are 
sufficiently consolidated that they are respected 
by political elites, who play within the rules, and 
a change in administration or leadership does not 
result in wholesale changes to institutions or the 
political rules of the game.
It is testament to the institutionalization of 
Ethiopian politics that the national bureaucracy 
continued to function for the last six years 
following the death of its pre-eminent figure, and 
the rules of the political game were respected 
to the extent of two peaceful power transitions. 
However, the political crisis of the last three 
years, the growth of corruption in the public 
service, and the growing disputation over 
the fundamentals of the constitution, suggest 
that the institutionalization is not sufficiently 
consolidated.
All institutions can be reformed without losing 
their fundamental socio-political functions. A 
certain degree of turnover of senior post-holders 
is to be expected, and indeed is a necessary part 
of the life of an institution. Some of the rhetoric of 
PM Abiy appears to go further, in terms of hinting 
at the delegitimization of important national 
institutions such as the military, using words 
such as ‘terrorist’. Government departments and 
parastatals are all undergoing accelerated senior 
staff turnover and moreover are being publicly 
discredited as corrupt, partisan or bankrupt.
The crisis within the EPRDF structures 
is particularly significant because as the 
dominant political party, and one that has 
become extensively coterminous with the 
state, its institutional transition demands 
special care. Although EPRDF structures have 
decayed seriously, there is no alternative but to 
maintaining them in some form, lest a political 
vacuum develop. The weakness of EPRDF 
leadership is enticing for those who would like 
to sweep it away and build anew, but this would 
come at the cost of de-institutionalizing politics 
(in both senses of the word). 
PM Abiy is also unclear as to the theory of 
democracy and developmentalism that impels 
his institutional reforms. Dismantling institutions 
because they are unpopular is a tactic not a 
strategy. It would be very easy for him to cater to 
the diverse interests and political philosophies 
that share a common programme of dismantling 
institutions, and find that he no longer possesses 
effective institutions of state with which to 
implement national policy.
PM Abiy’s supporters are not entirely consistent 
in their position on whether they came to power 
through the ‘rules of the game’ or are intending 
to disrupt those rules. This provides political 
ammunition to their critics who claim that 
the correct procedures have not entirely been 
followed. The test of this will be the adherence to 
the rules of procedure for the upcoming EPRDF 
Congress and the preparations for the elections of 
2020. 
If the ‘rules of the game’ are indeed disrupted and institutions of government are indeed weakened, 
the likely outcome in Ethiopia will be a political 
marketplace in which money combines with 
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populist agendas (identity politics) to rule.
What are the prospects for the federal system?
Ethiopia’s federal system is controversial. It would 
be an error to re-litigate the rancorous debates 
of the 1990s. But a constitution that solved a set 
of problems for one generation will inevitably 
create another set of problems for the next 
generation. The debate that is needed is, what did 
the federal constitution achieve in the historical 
circumstances in which it was introduced, and 
what elements of it need to be reconsidered 
today? What are the positive and negative aspects 
of identity politics in Ethiopia?
Constitutions are living entities and need to 
be adapted as circumstances change. That is 
particularly the case for federal systems in 
countries undergoing rapid socio-economic 
transformation. The 1995 constitution is a 
framework for governing a post-imperial agrarian 
society. What is the constitutional system best 
suited for Ethiopia’s political-economic future as 
an industrializing middle-income country while 
protecting the valued legacies of the past?
The federal constitution kept Ethiopia together 
in the 1990s. For the first time it recognized 
the equality of cultural-nations and the rights 
of minorities. It overturned the notion that 
Ethiopian identity could be defined by any one 
culture, language and value system. The federal 
system has provided different public-political 
goods to different groups, including: recognition 
of status as indigenous peoples with a privileged 
claim on their historic lands, self-government and 
an expression of national identity; cultural and 
language rights; and opportunities for political 
mobilization. 
In most developing countries, identity politics 
takes the form of bargains between political 
leaders and the customary custodians of 
identity (tribal authorities, religious leaders). 
Political entrepreneurs play the ethnic card in 
order to gain political advantage, but find that 
their legitimacy now depends on acceding to 
some of the demands of those custodians. In 
Ethiopia, the revolution removed most of the 
traditional authorities and reduced the power 
of religious leaders. However, identity-based 
legitimacy has re-emerged in new forms. Some 
legitimacy has accrued to the administrators of 
the ethno-national units of the federation (which 
is problematic, as administrative nationalists 
are inherently conservative). New cultural 
entrepreneurs have used the media to mobilize 
identity movements. New religious movements 
(Salafists and Pentecostals) have wiped away all 
intermediary spiritual hierarchies leaving only 
congregations of individuals facing the Almighty 
(a new and unpredictable element in the mix). 
Perhaps most importantly, some EPRDF leaders 
and cadres themselves also tried to manipulate 
the dynamics of ethno-nationalism for their own 
political advantage. Any hopes that the Federal 
Constitution might have tamed nationalism, 
or permanently solved the problem of multi-
nationalism, were shown to be unfounded.
Identity politics is therefore in rapid flux and 
up for contestation. One of the generalities 
of exclusivist or intolerant identity politics is 
that it is rivalry for leadership within a group 
that is most powerful in fomenting extremism, 
with conflict between groups as the secondary 
outcome of that process, though a particularly 
dangerous one. Because the Ethiopian system 
consists not only of constitutional-administrative 
federalism but also of political ethno-
nationalism—the EPRDF’s constituent parties 
are organized on these lines—it is especially 
vulnerable to political entrepreneurship within 
its own structures based on appeals to ethno-
nationalist identity. In turn, the most effective 
means for mobilizing ethno-nationalist sentiment 
is hostility towards an out-group, especially one 
perceived as threatening or dishonest. Allegations 
of unfair or corrupt allocation of power and 
wealth, become a powerful instrument for 
political advancement and organization.
The strength of the original EPRDF analytic 
of diversity, is that it identifies of nations, 
nationalities and peoples as historical entities 
Instead of democratizing, these 
countries tend to transform either into 
political markets or authoritarian 
systems, or descend into civil wars.
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and thus prone to change. The weakness is that 
there is no mechanism for discussing that change 
in a constructive manner, let alone bringing 
it the required changes in the political and 
administrative system. In its implementation over 
the last quarter century, the federal arrangement 
has become centrifugal, for several reasons. First, 
the educational curricula of the different regions 
have fragmented the Ethiopian public sphere, 
and parallel political debates are conducted in 
different languages. Second, the primordialist or 
essentialist view of ethnicity has become more 
pronounced as the historical-constructivist 
analytic has faded from view, and previous 
historic processes of identity-assimilation and 
cultural change have become more difficult. 
The way in which the constitution recognizes 
diversity is very simplistic: it doesn’t permit the 
kinds of multiple and shifting identities that allow 
societies to adapt and modernize. In the current 
generation, social capital has been reconfigured 
in an overwhelmingly ethno-nationalist manner. 
Third, the administrative organization of Ethiopia, 
along with the division of the EPRDF into ethno-
national parties, has come to shape the nature 
of ethno-political identity itself. In other words, 
identity politics is ripe for tactical manipulation 
by populist leaders, including from the ranks of 
the EPRDF itself.
All these questions are extremely delicate and 
could be explosive if mis-handled. Ethiopia 
can learn from other federal systems that have 
grappled with comparable complexities, in the 
context of rapid economic transitions, such as 
India. 
There are alarming indications that the current 
political and territorial dispensation of the federal 
system is in jeopardy, with eruptions of inter-
communal violence in many parts of the country. 
There are several conflicts over boundaries 
between regions (Amhara and Tigray, Somali 
and Oromo). There are conflicts over rights of 
residence in localities that may translate into 
demands for existing regions to be divided, 
possibly creating new states (Southern region). 
There are conflicts over the status of indigenous 
peoples and settlers in other locations (Gambella 
and Beni Shangul). There is a proposal that the 
House of Federation should develop criteria for 
allocating federal projects ‘equitably’ among 
regions, which, if adopted, would change the role 
of the Federal Government towards an allocator of 
wealth among the regions rather than the engine 
of building a common economic and political 
community—a formula for unending disputes. 
Inter-communal violence will also have the very 
unfortunate effect of hardening ethno-national 
divisions. These divisions will appear deep-
rooted and primordial rather than a construct 
of historical circumstances. They will further 
legitimize political mobilization on the basis of 
identity politics.  
Is Ethiopia becoming a political marketplace?
Ethiopia is not a political marketplace. It will 
not become a violent chaotic one that resembles 
Somalia or South Sudan, but it may become a 
hybrid form more akin to Kenya or South Africa.
Corruption and the political marketplace are 
closely linked, though they are not identical. 
Typically, the main mechanism in which an 
institutionalized, authoritarian state transitions 
to a political marketplace is through the 
combination of corrupt deals and political 
competition. Politicians facing competition for 
party nominations or in open elections need 
money for their campaigns. Those in office need 
money to consolidate their patronage networks. The best opportunities for obtaining this money 
are through large-scale deals, especially with 
foreign investors.
Corruption needs to be understood in context. 
There is no historical case in which accelerated 
economic growth has not been accompanied by 
corruption. It is remarkably hard to measure 
corruption, but Transparency International 
provides a yearly ranking of corruption 
The way in which the constitution 
recognizes diversity is very simplistic: it 
doesn’t permit the kinds of multiple and 
shifting identities that allow societies to 
adapt and modernize. 
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perceptions. Ethiopia hasn’t changed much on 
this: in 2012 it was ranked 113 out of 176; in 
2017 it was 107 out of 180. Ethiopia is perceived 
as less corrupt than neighbouring countries. 
However, Ethiopians tend to aver that corruption 
has worsened, and they complain about 
corruption more than others. 
One of the features of Ethiopian corruption 
today is that the proceeds of corrupt activities 
are largely invested in the domestic economy 
rather than hidden abroad. Another is that there 
is no established culture of negotiations over 
liabilities, by which I mean that small capitalists 
who evade taxes or cheat on licenses rarely 
have the chance to make a deal with the tax 
authorities whereby they pay a penalty and can 
thereby obtain reputable status. Rather, they live 
in fear that they will be punished harshly. This 
has the consequence that the class of emergent 
capitalists, which should be the support base 
for the EPRDF, tends to hide itself away at any 
moment of political confrontation rather than 
organize as a political force in support of the 
current dispensation. This may be one reason why 
those who have benefited from the last twenty 
years of growth are not ready to credit the EPRDF 
for their material advancement.
In all languages and political cultures, the concept 
of ‘corruption’ has both a material and a moral 
dimension. It could be argued that because 
Ethiopians expect the state to be autonomous 
from society and to unite the material and 
spiritual realms, the notion of ‘corruption’ 
carries a greater moral charge than in countries 
where material bargaining is intrinsic to political 
relations (such as Kenya or Sudan). By inveighing 
against ‘rent-seeking’—a term that has never been 
widely understood by the population in general—
Meles probably made this problem worse, as he 
raised the moral bar. Demanding a high standard 
of ethics in leadership is a double-edged sword 
as leaders rarely live according to the code. And 
one of the most consistent findings of political 
psychology is that the most-disliked kind of 
offender is the hypocrite. Those who are brazenly 
criminal are less disliked than those caught out in 
small hypocrisies.
It is always tempting for a new government 
to engage in a high-profile campaign against 
corruption. Unless this is based on a thorough 
political-economic analysis of the contours of 
the issue, this can readily become a politically-
partisan purge or a tool for generating insecurity. 
Anti-corruption initiatives need to be scrutinized 
as closely as corruption itself.
Another feature of Ethiopian corruption is that 
financial corruption has not become a driving 
factor in politics, or at least not yet. Ethiopia 
does not have a political marketplace in which 
electoral campaigns, patronage politics, and policy 
decisions are driven by the economics of supply 
and demand. It is not a political marketplace in 
which allegiances are traded for material reward. 
For sure, there are individual cases of corrupt 
transactions that affect gaining or holding political 
office, but this is not the dominant logic according 
to which politics is organized.
The most important element of corruption to 
monitor in the political arena is political finance. 
For example, we should analyze payments in 
the context of privatization deals, new foreign 
investment, and (especially) arms purchases, to 
see if additional funds are provided to finance the 
activities of political parties or candidates. 
The questions to ask are: what factors make 
Ethiopia vulnerable to the monetization or 
marketization of politics? What would such a 
process look like it if it were to occur?
The most obvious vulnerability is that Ethiopians 
are not used to the kind of political horse trading 
and bargaining that is common in other countries. 
There is an element of political innocence. The 
laws controlling political competition including 
financing of political parties, political advertising, 
etc., are not suited to competitive politics, and 
there is no experience in enforcing such matters 
as campaign funding laws. It will be tempting for 
the new administration to liberalize the political 
arena in a way that creates a free-for-all for those 
with money to spend. This also means that, in 
comparison to other countries in Africa in the 
Middle East, political market predators (such 
as the specialist advisory firms in the U.S. and 
Israel) may think that Ethiopian politics can be 
influenced or bought cheaply, and may rush in.
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The relative lack of experience in political 
bargaining also means that Ethiopian political 
entrepreneurs may find that it is more effective to 
promote public messages of total change, rather 
than advocating dialogue and compromise.
What best protects Ethiopia from the 
marketization of politics are its institutions 
and rules. These can be restrictive and indeed 
oppressive, but their value will be recognized if 
they are gone.
What is Ethiopia’s position in the wider region?
Ethiopia’s standing in the Horn of Africa, Africa, 
the Red Sea arena and greater Middle East, and 
the world, are a mixture of its hard and soft 
power. Ethiopia’s military has a high reputation. 
Ethiopia’s economy is among the fastest-growing 
in the world. Ethiopia has set an agenda on key 
issues, including African peace and security, 
climate change, economic integration, and the 
developmental state. The intellectual agenda-
setting has often been conducted in a discreet 
manner, through multilateral organizations and 
without publicly proclaiming leadership, which 
has contributed to its success.
Ethiopia’s strengths in this area include the 
institutional memory of its foreign affairs and 
security leaders, and its valued reputation for 
understated but principled leadership.
In today’s emerging world of bilateral, 
transactional, monetized and coercive 
international relations, Ethiopia has much more 
to lose than to gain. It is overshadowed by far 
richer and more accomplished operators in the 
transnational political markets of the greater 
Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. Its economic gains from embracing 
the global market will be isolated windfalls; 
its advantages in the security arena will be 
subordinate to the interests of bigger players.
Ethiopia has invested in a multilateral order 
based on norms, principles and institutions, at the 
African Union and United Nations. The emergent 
order in the Horn of Africa is the hegemonic 
Middle East strategic alliance of Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, backed by Egypt, Israel 
and the United States. This is based on money 
and military capacity. Despite being dubbed 
a ‘NATO for the Middle East’, it has no treaty 
containing norms, principles and institutions, and 
its hegemony threatens the African peace and 
security architecture.
Ethiopia’s 2002 national security and foreign affairs strategy is now outdated and was never more than a statement of intent, and the promise 
of holding a public discussion on the goals and 
strategies was never fulfilled. Attempts to bring it 
up to date in recent years did not translate into a 
coherent strategy. This is another area in which a 
national debate is required.
What are the prospects for democracy?
This paper argues that it is simplistic to make 
the case for democracy as though that were 
unproblematic in process and outcome.
The prospect of a swift and painless transition to a 
western-style democracy are of course zero: such 
a thing has happened only in dreams, and it is not 
useful to use perfection as a metric with which 
to judge the present, as it will not be possible to 
judge progress accurately. The better prospect is 
of an open public arena in which Ethiopians can 
engage in political debate and exercise political 
freedoms, without the future being dictated by 
either political finance or coercion.
The next two years will be the test for Ethiopia’s 
democratization: will this be a managed transition 
to openness and pluralism, a chaotic arena of 
unregulated competition, or a takeover by a new 
political force?
The repression of the opposition and the de facto 
one party system in place for the last thirteen 
The next two years will be the test for 
Ethiopia’s democratization: will this 
be a managed transition to openness 
and pluralism, a chaotic arena of 
unregulated competition, or a takeover 
by a new political force?
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years has been extremely unhealthy for Ethiopian 
democracy. Among other things, the de facto 
merger of the EPRDF with the state apparatus 
has meant that the EPRDF as a party has lost its 
identity. The exclusion of the opposition from 
legislature and executive at any level and in any 
location has meant that non-EPRDF politicians 
have not had any opportunity to learn the arts of 
governance.
The Ethiopian government has grossly misused its 
counter-terror legislation to suppress dissent and 
close down the public realm. Legitimate concerns 
over the ways in which some media whipped up 
ethnic animosities, and some NGOs could have 
become vehicles for foreign interests, led to over-
harsh laws, implemented in a draconian manner. 
This has impoverished public debate in Ethiopia: 
less than two years before the next election is a very short period of time to reinvigorate that 
debate. 
Meles’s musings on a dominant party system, or 
a two-party system with rival developmentalist 
parties, are now history with limited relevance. 
A multi-party system is coming, with all its rough 
edges. Ethiopia has never had a real plural system, 
with coalition politics and power sharing.
A very general lesson that can be learned from 
transitions from authoritarian and single party 
systems is this: the most sustainable transitions 
are those that are initiated and led by reformers 
within the dominant party. Attempts to wipe the 
slate clean and start from scratch tend to end in 
disappointment. Ethiopia is well positioned for 
top-down reformism.
One fundamental question is, what will happen 
to the EPRDF? Can it survive, and indeed should 
it survive? What plans does PM Abiy have for the 
party?Let me note three important strengths of 
the EPRDF. First, it has an internal system of 
deliberation. Its meetings are usually closed 
and interminable. But it does retain a tradition 
of discussion and argument following certain 
rules. Those discussions have been the only real 
political deliberation in Ethiopia that has some 
relation to the levers of power. One option for the 
EPRDF is to make its discussions public and to 
invite representatives of all other stakeholders to 
participate. That would be its parting gift before 
stepping down as the dominant party: to bring all 
Ethiopians into its consultations.
A second strength of the EPRDF as a party is 
that it has rules of procedure that meant that it 
can call its leaders to account, as we have seen 
this year. The change in national leadership 
was effected through a party mechanism in an 
orderly and peaceful manner. That is also a norm, 
a fundamental principle, and an institutional 
mechanism that should be cherished.
A third strength—shared with state 
bureaucracies—is institutional memory. Ethiopia 
is an orderly society, run on the basis of rules, 
institutions and established ways of doing 
business. Often the bureaucracy is frustratingly 
slow and change averse. But the value of 
continuity and institutional memory should not 
be overlooked, especially at a time of rapid change 
in other spheres.
The weaknesses of the EPRDF are multiple. After 
more than 25 years in power, and having been 
folded into the state apparatus, it has atrophied. 
It is no longer the vigorous vanguard party that 
it once was. It is formally constituted as a single 
party. But neither is it a party organized to 
compete with others in a fair contest, or share 
power as part of a coalition. Its structure, based 
exclusively on national parties from different 
federal regions, is surely outmoded, and arguably 
even a recipe for conflict.
More important than structures and rules of 
politics are the substantive values of a society. 
These are changing in ways that are evident to 
all Ethiopians, but perhaps not well understood. 
Two changes are particularly noteworthy. One is 
the enormous rise in education: Ethiopians today 
are far more literate and connected than ever 
before. A second is that new religious affiliations 
are growing fast. As is to be expected, rapid social 
modernization leads to spirituality based on 
individualism and universalism, sweeping away 
the more hierarchical, mystical and ceremonial 
forms of religious practice associated with 
complex settled communities. Most evangelical 
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and Pentecostal churches promote self-help and a 
work ethic, as do Salafis and the Muslim Brothers; 
they are the spiritual counterparts of a neo-liberal 
capitalist order. The public ethics they enjoin 
are appealing to many, but they may also disrupt 
the societal consensus that has made Ethiopia 
relatively orderly.
Ethiopia’s new PM is an outsider to almost all 
traditions of the country’s politics: he is an ethnic 
Oromo, from a religious movement that is new 
in the country, with a fresh and bold public style. 
He is a force for change. Ethiopia undoubtedly 
needs fresh thinking and action in many areas. 
But disruption also has its dangers, especially in a 
country in which the governing institutions could 
be disrupted with relative ease, leaving perilous 
gaps in the political economy, law and order, and 
intellectual leadership that have been so essential 
to Ethiopia’s recent transformations.
CONCLUSIONS
Ethiopia is entering a new era. However, much 
Ethiopian political discourse is fragmented, 
polarized, polemical and dominated by the logic of 
ethno-nationalism. 
In this paper, I have tried to pose key questions 
and introduce some concepts that I believe are 
relevant to the Ethiopian predicament today. 
My principal motivation is that my framework 
of the ‘political marketplace’ suggests that the 
reforms undertaken by PM Abiy may have the 
unintended consequence of facilitating a political 
marketplace system in Ethiopia. Rather than a 
dynamic market economy and a flourishing liberal 
democracy, Ethiopia runs the risk of having a 
façade of these characteristics, while forfeiting 
many of the gains of sustainable development, 
social welfare, functioning institutions and foreign 
policy autonomy. Is Ethiopia to become a small 
open economy in a turbulent global market, as 
a junior associate of a military coalition that is 
transactional, not treaty-based? And, perhaps the 
most pressing question of the day, is the EPRDF 
able to manage the dynamics of conflictual ethno-
national political mobilization that emerge from 
its own ranks, legitimized by the political system 
that it has constructed and dominated?
I  hope that this paper will be a small contribution 
towards stimulating such a public debate.
